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IN THE SUPRE11E COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LUCILLE JESSE MOFFAT THORNOCK, ) 
\'/ILLA LUCILLE THORNOCK KENNEDY,) 
ADEN KAY THORNOCK, JOHN RUSSELL) 
THORNOCK, and LOIS ANN THORNOCK) 
BRO\'/N, the Determined Heirs of ) 
ADEN l'IOODRUFF THORNOCK, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs and Respondents ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
LOIS S. COOK ) 
) 
Defendant and Appellant ) 
) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~> 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to quiet title to mineral rights in 
certain real property located in Rich County, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Rich County granted a Default 
Certificate against all defendants exce~t Appellant LOIS S. COOK, 
who alone appeared and answered; granted Summary Judgment for 
Plaintiffs upon Plaintiff's Motion; and issued a Decree of Quiet 
Title confirming title to the disputed mineral rights in plain~ 
tiffs. From this Sul1\1'1ary Judgment and Decree, Defendant LOIS S. 
COOK appealed. The Supreme court affirmed the Judgment and Decree, 
and Defendant petitions for rehearing. 
2 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON A~PEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Su!T\I'lary Judgment be\. c~·I 
and a remand to the District Court for a trial by jury on:-: 
merits. 
STATEI-lENT OF FACTS 
Appellant refers to and incorporates herein by referen:! 
i 
the Statement set forth in Appellant's Brief on this Appeal.' 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT'S DEPOSITION TESTIMONY, IF ANY AMBIGUITIES AND 
INCONSISTENCIES ARE RESOLVED IN HER FAVOR BY VIEWING THE TESTIMONY 
IN T:IE LIGHT !10ST FAVORABLE TO HER, AFFORDS EVIDENCE OF DURESS 
AND COERCION IN THE EXECUTION OF THE 1959 QUITCLAIM DEED WHICH PRE-
CLUDES SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Summary judgment is only in order where there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). When such a 
motion against a defendant is made, it may .be granted only if the 
undisputed facts establish that he has no defense: 
On a motion for sul'Ul\ary judgment against 
a defendant, where some of the facts are 
in dispute, a judgment can properly be 
rendered against a defendant only if, on 
the undisputed facts, the defendant has 
no valid defense; if then any material 
fact asserted by the plaintiff is contra-
dicted by the defendant, the facts as 
stated by the defendant must, on such 
motion, be taken as true. 
Disabled American Veterans v. Hendrixson, 
9 Utah2d 152, 154, 340 P. 2d 416 (1959). 
The judgment can be given only if there is no dispute on a 
material evidentiary matter. Burningham v. Ott, 525 P.2d 620, 62l 
(Utah 1974). There is to be no weighing of evidence or evaluation 
of credibility of witnesses: "The court cannot consider the weight 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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of testimony or the credibility of witnesses in considering, 
motion for summary judgment." Singleton v. Alexander, 19 CU. 
292, 294, 431 P.2d 126 (1967). As stated in Holbrook Co."·: 
542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975): 
It is not the purpose of the sUJTlITlary 
judgment procedure to judge the credi-
bility of the avernents of parties, or 
witnesses, or the weight of evidence. 
Neither is it to deny parties the right 
to a trial to resolve disputed issues of 
fact. Its purpose is to eliminate the 
time, trouble and expense of trial when 
upon any view taken of the facts as 
asserted by the party ruled against, he 
would not be entitled to prevail. Only 
when it so appears, is the court justified 
in refusing such a party the opportunity 
of presenting his evidence and attempting 
to persuade the fact trier to his views. 
Conversely, if there is any dispute as to 
any issue, material to the settlement of 
the controversy, the surIDary judgment 
should not be granted. 
As discussed more fully in reviewing the evidence below,: 
triable issue of fact raised by the defendant's amended answe: 
which is at issue in this phase of the case is duress. It is 
the defendant's position that if she and her husband quitclai;o 
mineral rights to Aden Thornock in 1959 they did so under du:e' 
Her sta.te of mind and that of her husband are consequently er.: 
issues: If they unwillingly executed the deed because their·;: 
. . voi· d and his s. 
were overborne by Thornock's harassnent, it is 
sors cannot claim anything thereunder. In deterriining whethe: 
conveyance is procured by duress, the grantor's physical a~" 
' t ' 
state may be considered as bearing upon his \'/ill to resis ... 
likelihood of its being overcone. 
9 l r Johnson v. Johns~, Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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44, 337 P.2d 420 (1959). Thus both the circumstances of the 
exeuction of the conveyance and the personal attributes of the 
grantor enter into a determination of duress, and both these 
circumstances are matters of fact. But summary judgment is not 
usually appropriate where the issue raised concerns a subjective 
state of mind. Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 967 
(D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967). Summary 
judgment is particularly inappropriate where, as here, the issue 
involved is the defendant's state of mind. Ross v. John's Bargain 
Stores Corp., 464 F.2d 111, 115 (5th Cir. 1972). The perusal 
of transcribed deposition testimony at second-hand is insufficient 
basis for deciding whether this deed was the product of the gen-
uine free will of the grantors or of the continous "hounding" by 
the grantee--at least where, as here, the surviving grantor 
asserts that their will was overborne and further testifies to 
a pattern of harassment which compelled them to sign the deed 
in order to be left in peace. 
Where there has been a motion for summary judgment, the 
burden of proof is on the moving party. Revlon, Inc. v. Regal 
Pharmacy, Inc., 29 F.R.D. 169, 171 (E.D. Mich. 1961). The moving 
party has the heavy burden of positively and clearly demonstrating 
that there is no genuine issue of fact, and any doubt as to the 
existence of such an issue is resolved against him. National 
Screen Service Corp. v. Poster Exchange, Inc., 305 F.2d 647, 651 
(5th Cir. 1962). Even if the nonmoving party comes forth with 
nothing, summary judgment must be denied if the facts supporting 
6 
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the motion do not establish the nonexistence of a genuine fac: , 
issue. Bloomgarden v. Coyer, 479 F.2d 201, 2_06-07 (D.c. c,' 
1973). Since the deposition testimony of the defendant, Mrs,[I 
does furnish some evidence of duress and , , I coercion in the exec.· .. 
of the quitclaim deed under which plaintiffs assert their cloi: 
summary judgment should not have been granted. 
Even at this juncture of the case, on appeal, the defend2:: 
against whom summary judgment has been rendered is entitled tc 
have this Court survey the evidence, and all inferences reasori 
to be drawn from it, in the light mostfavorable to her. White! 
v. W.T. Grant Co., 16 Utah2d 81, 82, 395 P.2d 918 (1964); Tho::; 
I 
_ Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah2d 30, 31-32, 395 P. 2d 62 (1964). r:I 
purposes of appeal from summary judgment in favor of the plrn:! 
the defendant's version of facts will be accepted as true.!'.'.£ 
v. First National Bank of Anchorage, 584 P.2d 1125, 1126 (Alas: 
1978). If there is the slightest doubt as to the material fac: 
, Gra'' I 
the judgment will be reversed for a trial on the merits. _:;' 
Dealers Mutual Insurance Co. v. James, 118 Ariz. 116, ll8, 
315 (1978). Thus, apparent contradictions or ambiguities in:' 
Cook's deposition testimony, if the Court perceives any, shou!' 
be resolved in her favor. Not only is that the recogni~d 
of review, it also reflects the psychological reality oft~ 
'!''' 
situation if the court takes into account the personal fral"' 
. . rnstances' 
of Mrs. Cook and the unfamiliar and threatening circu 
~' : 
which she underwent her first experience of being deposed.,,. 
this cour: 
cussed further below, the trial court concluded and 
cook's aeposiu:r 
has hitherto agreed that the d:fendant Mrs. I 
Jiiii 
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testimony does not prove her claim of duress and coercion in 
the execution of the 1959 quitclaim deed. That may be a reading 
of the evidence which a factfinder could properly arrive at. But 
such a determination necessarily involves the weighing of evidence, 
the crediting of certain statements and the discounting cf others, 
and a judgment about the witness's credibility. For purposes 
of summary judgment, however, evidence may not be weighed nor 
credibility considered. Those functions properly belong to the 
jury. The fact, if it is a fact, that the party against whom 
the motion is made is unlikely to prevail at trial is not suffi-
cient to authorize summary judgment against him. National Screen 
Service Corp. v. Poster Exchange, Inc., supra, 305 F.2d at 651. 
This Court should reconsider its judgment and reverse the trial 
court, not because its evaluation of the evidence is necessarily 
an unreasonable one, but because that kind of evaluation exceeds 
the narrow range of considerations justifying summary judgment. 
It appears from the text of this Court's opinion that its 
conclusion that there is no genuine fact issue respecting the 
duress issue rests wholly on its interpretation of Mrs. Cook's 
own deposition testimony. There is no other evidence as yet 
adduced relating to the circumstances in which the 1959 quitclaim 
deed was executed. Thus the closest scrutiny of this testimony 
is called for, bearing in mind that it is to be viewed in a manner 
most favorable to Mrs. Cook. 
Mrs. cook is an elderly widow, without business experience, 
who relied on her husband to handle business matters (Dep. 1, 16, 17) • 
8 
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She is legally unsophisticated. She had never been deposed 
before (Dep. 3), she had difficulty understanding many of 
the questions -- including those inquiring about "duress" an,:' 
"coercion" (Dep. 52) -- and was not even sure what a "defend;· 
is (Dep. 58), although that is her role in this case. She•,::: 
confused by the proceeding (Dep. 7). Counsel for the plaint!' 
took advantage of her age and inexperience and badgered her:; 
repeating questions which she was unable to answer, often as:!: 
them five, six or even more times. (E.g., Dep. 24). The in~: 
I 
gation related to events occurring almost 20 years ago, whicn.' 
as Mrs. Cook observed, "a long ways back" ( Dep. 10) . Not sun: 
singly she was unable to recollect many details, a circurnstar.: 1 
seized upon by plaintiffs' counsel to impugn her honesty and 
threaten her with legal sanctions. One of these attorneys g:' 
tui tously threatened her with sanctions unless she agreed oi: 
spot to ascertain and disclose her checking account n~b~tt 
at a later time (Dep. 41), and repeated his threat a little k 
(Dep. 46). The same attorney charged that Mrs. Cook had "sat 
during the last hour and consciously and maliciously 
lied un~:: 1 
oath for the sale purpose of obfuscating the truth" (Dep. 411 ' 
Mrs. Cook did not recollect very much of the 1959 transac: 
but she testified straightforwardly that Aden Thornock procur' 
Peated the execution of the deed, if at all, by constantly re 
9 
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demands upon each of the Cooks until their resistance was 
worn down. She was not sure if she signed the deed at all 
(Dep. 6); she knew only that she had signed "some papers" 
because "Mr. Thornock was after us continually" (Dep. B; see 
also Dep. 10 and passim). As she put it: 
He hounded us continually. He just was at us 
continually. He never gave us any peace. 
When we stepped out the door, he was there, 
and I thought when we bought the house, we 
bought everything (Dep. 9). 
Her understanding had always been that she and her husband bought 
the property "and all that went with it." (Dep. 17). She said 
Thornock didn't threaten her "with physical violence," but 
plaintiff's counsel did not pursue the matter when she did not 
directly answer a question whether legal or other threats were 
made against her (Dep. 21). Thornock did contact each of the 
Cooks separately and repeatedly to get them to sign (Dep. 56) . 
Toward the end of the deposition, after the aforementioned threats 
were made, she did say that no one forced, threatened or coerced her 
(Dep. 51), but this answer is hardly decisive under the circum-
stances, especially since it immediately came out that she did not 
know what "duress" and "coercion" meant in any event (Dep. 52). If 
viewed in the light most favorable to her, the defendant's testi-
mony was such that a trier of fact could find that, even absent 
explicit threats or overt violence, the Cook's consent to execution 
of the quitclaim deed was procured by incessant harrassment at 
10 
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their home by Aden Thornock until the Cooks agreed to sign, 
as Mrs. Cook testified, quoting her husband, to "get him off 
our back" (Dep. 29). That is all the defendant maintains at 
this juncture of the case. But that is enought to preclude 
summary judgment as to the duress issue. 
Mrs. Cook made some statements that may tend to be adverSi 
to her in answer to harrassing and conclusory questions whose i 
import was unclear to her. The defendant does not take the 
position that the plaintiffs are not entitled at trial to make 
use of this testimony, to the extent consonant with the rules~ 
of evidence, to be accorded such weight as seems appropriate:: 
the jury. By the same token, the defendant would be entitled 
to explain her answers, to introduce other answers from her ti' 
mony which sustain her position, and to show the circumstanced 
which the testimony was taken. But the defendant does emphatl 
insist that the weighing of evidence, the resolution of conflil 
and the assessment of credibility are matters peculiarly with:·r 
the province of the factfinder. These functions cannot proper 
be discharged by either a trial court or an appellate court 
working from the cold record alone. At trial, Mrs. cook will I 
, I 
d interrogation' the protection of an independent judge an any 
and cont! 
takes place will be subject to the rules of evidence I 
: 
by the court. 
11 
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") 
" 
:I 
Neither the trial court nor this Court was present when 
Mrs. Cook testified, and the record is barren of evidence 
of her bearing and demeanor and the manner in which she delivered 
her testimony. These intangible but important aspects of 
determining credibility will clearly be crucial, upon the trial 
of this case, to the resolution of the duress issue. It may be 
resolved adversely to the defendant. But where such considera-
tions properly enter into the factfinder's determination, as here, 
summary judgment is premature and inappropriate. "Summary 
judgment is not proper when an issue turns on credibility." 
Eagle v. Louisiana & Southern Life Insurance Co., 464 F.2d 607, 
608 (10th Cir. 1972). Such is the situation here. 
Where any arguable issue of duress or coercion is in issue, 
this Court has shown itself to be adverse to efforts to abort 
exploration of the issue at trial by way of summary judgment. 
In Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance 
Underwriters, Inc., 16 Utah2d 211, 213, 398 P.2d 685 (1965), in 
an opinion authored by Chief Justice Crockett, the Court reversed 
the entry of swnmary judgment for defendant insurer where its 
11 insured alleged that a settlement and release was obtained by 
1 ,1 fraud and duress. The plaintiff claimed he was coerced into 
executing the release as to one claim because the adjuster told 
him he could not be paid on a second and related claim unless 
he signed. 16 utah2d at 214. It was enough for the Court to 
12 
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justify its reversal of surrunary judgment that if the facts 
were entirely as the insured claimed that -- not that, in 
fact, he was entitled to relief from settlement -- but that r.; 
"may well" be so entitled: 
If we accept the facts as plaintiff contends 
them to be, as we are obliged to do on this 
review, we must assume not only that the 
plaintiff was in economic distress, but that 
the defendant knew this and took advantage of 
him by falsely representing that money 
belonging to the plaintiff could not be 
delivered to him, and wrongfully refusing to 
deliver it unless plaintiff would also accept 
the proffered settlement on defendant's 
policy, which resulted in compelling plaintiff 
to accept the latter settlement against his 
will. If found to be true, this false 
representation, coupled with the wrongful 
withholding of that which belonged to plaintiff, 
may well justify a finding of duress which would 
afford him relief from the settlement. 
16 Utah2d at 215. (footnotes omitted). 
In holding that summary disposition was unwarranted, the 
Court set forth the rationale for a standard of review by whic 
doubts are resolved in favor of trial by jury: 
The summary disposal of a case serves a 
salutary purpose in avoiding time, tro~b~e 
and expense of a trial when it is justified. 
But unless it is clearly so, there are other 
evils to be guarded against. A party with 
a legitimate cause, but who is unable to 
afford an appeal may be turned away without 
his day in court; or, when an appeal is taken, 
if a reversal results and a trial court is 
ordered, the time, trouble and expense is 
increased rather than diminished. It is.to 
avoid these evils and to safeguard the right 
of access to the courts for the enforcement 
of rights and the remedy of wrongs by a tri~l, 
and by a jury if desired, that it is of sue 
importance that the court should take care to 
13 > 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
see that the party adversely affected has 
a fair opportunity to present his contentions 
against precipitate action which will deprive 
him of that privilege. His contentions as to 
the facts should be considered in the light 
most favorable to him, and only if it clearly 
appears that he could not establish a right 
to recovery under the law should such action 
be taken; and any doubts which exist should 
be resolved in favor of affording him the 
privilege of a trial. 
Upon the consideration of the record it has 
come to us we cannot conclude with such certainty 
as to justify ruling as a matter of law that 
there was no duress and/or fraud practiced upon 
the plaintiff in obtaining the release in question. 
Accordingly, it is necessary that the cause be 
remanded for trial. 
16 Utah2d at 216-17. (footnotes omitted). 
In the instant case, it is enough to preclude summary judgment 
if Mrs. Cook's story of unceasing harrassment of both her husband 
and herself caused them to execute the quitclaim deed to be rid 
of Aden Thornock's importunities. Whether the harassment was of 
such effect as to amount to duress and coercion is a question for 
the jury, taking into account the personalities and circumstances 
of the parties and the meaning they attributed to their act. 
Cases in which the underlying issue is one of motive, intent, or 
other subjective fact are particularly inappropriate for summary 
judgment, as are those in which the issue turns on credibility. 
Conrad v. Delta Airlines, rnc., 494 F.2d 914, 918 (7th Cir. 1974) · 
14 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Since this case implicates both these considerations, it is 
doubly inappropriate for resolution by the drastic and 
final disposition of summary judgment. 
' . 
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POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS AS MOVING PARTY DID NOT SPECIFY 
THE FACTS SUPPOSEDLY ESTABLISHING A PRIOR 
SEVERANCE OF SURFACE AND MINERAL ESTATES 
SUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF 
ADVERSE POSSESSION, AND ON THE FACTS PRESENTED 
BY THE RECORD THE RULE RELATING TO SEVERANCE 
IS INAPPLICABLE. 
16 
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As noted under Point I above, the burden is on the 
moving party to justify sununary judgment in his favor. One 
aspect of this burden is a basic obligation to relate the 
legal arguments to the record evidence on which the moving 
party proposes to rely. The opposing party should not have 
to speculate about the factual underpinnings of the moving 
party's conclusory assertions, nor should the opposing party 
have to do the moving party's job for him by anticipating and 
refuting every imaginable use which might conceivably be made 
of the evidence in the record. Courts disapprove the practice 
"of dumping an extensive record on a busy trial judge without 
guidance from counsel, expecting him to ferret out facts whic'· 
might conceivably be relevant on a motion for summary judgmep: 
American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 510 F. 2d 1043, 1056 n. 
(2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975). If there 
was any severance of surface and mineral estates in this case 
might have occurred at any of many different times and ina 
variety of different ways. Severance may be effected by deei 
or by reservation or by adverse possession. Broadhurst_':'.!. 
American Colloid Co., 177 N.W.2d 261, 265 (S.D. 1970). What 
transaction or occurrence the plaintiffs rely on as constiti;: 
f th f ; le and the recor': a severance cannot be determined rom e ~ 
in their present state. unless and until they identify the 
17 
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supposed severance with specificity, sununary judgment in their 
favor is, to say the least, premature. 
A close examination of the proceedings before the trial 
court reveals that the plaintiffs never discharged their duty 
to articulate a proper basis for summary judgment as to the 
adverse possession claim, viz., prior severance of the mineral 
and surface estates, and to identify with specificity the 
undisputed evidence showing as a matter of law that severance 
took place. Plaintiffs' motion for sununary judgment of April 3, 
1978, was based on the grounds (1) that record title was in the 
plaintiffs; (2) that the defendant in her deposition testimony 
admitted she knew of no facts contradicting plaintiffs' record 
title; and (3) that the defendant admitted knowing of no facts 
sufficient to "reform, modify or rescind" the 1959 quitclaim 
conveyance." (The latter ground, relating to the quitclaim deed 
as an independent basis of plaintiffs' claims as discussed under 
Point I above, is for present purposes irrelevant.) Thus, the 
stated grounds of the motion, relating as they do solely to 
record title, are irrelevant to any claim by the defendant based 
on extrinsic circumstances outside the sequence of conveyances 
such as title obtained prescriptively by adverse possession. 
However, the defendant's amended answer and counterclaim filed 
two days later, on April 5, 1978, asserted the defendant's claim 
to the surface estate and its attendant mineral rights based on 
18 
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adv~rse possession. The plaintiffs never amended their 
motion to reflect the introduction of this new issue. Thus, 
the motion for summary judgment which the trial court gr ante: 
does not even purport to state grounds alleging that there i; 
no genuine fact issue as to adverse possession and that the 
plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as against that claim as 
a matter of law. 
Despite this seemingly fatal oversight, the plaintiffs' 
brief in support of their motion went beyond the grounds addu 
in the motion itself by briefly disputing the adverse posses2. 
claim (at page 34). Ci ting Kanawha & Hocking Coal & Coke Co. 
Carbon County, 535 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1975), plaintiffs arguedt· 
assuming a severance of the mineral and surface estates, adv:· 
possession of the surface estate is not adverse possess~n~ 
minerals. But a fact issue cannot be eliminated just by cit;: 
a case: Citation of authority "do[es] not supplant on a moll· 
for summary judgment the need for presentation of facts justil 
the granting thereof." Orange National Bank of Orange ~ 
Louisiana in New Orleans, 382 F. 2d 945, 949 (5th Cir. 196?). 
Neither the brief nor any other paper ever filed by the 
plaintiffs explained how or when the supposi tious severance c 
curred. 1 nclusio· Instead, the brief simply asserts a lega co 
19 
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"The mineral estate was effectively severed long before 
Defendant Cooks acquired possession of the subject property." 
In passing on a motion for summary judgment, statements which 
are legal conclusions rather than allegations of fact are 
disregarded. Welles v. Sauber, 142 F. Supp. 449, 451 (N.D. Ill. 
1956); Chi-Mil Corp. v. W.T. Grant Co., 70 F.R.D. 352, 358 (E.D. 
Wis. 1976). 
The plaintiffs never timely and sufficiently specified what 
facts their legal conclusion was based upon, nor did they establish 
as they were obliged to, that there was no genuine issue as to 
those facts or that those facts entitled them to judgment as a 
matter of law. 
In the present procedural posture of the case, the conclusion 
is inescapable that triable issues of fact exist with respect to 
the defendant's claim to title to the minerals by adverse 
possession. The defendant is in possession of the surface estate, 
and her claim to have adversely possessed the surface estate has 
never been controverted. Adverse possession of the surface estate 
extends to the underlying minerals. Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 
2d 864, 899, 442 P.2d 692 (1968). Prior to the severance of 
subsurface rights, possession of the surface implies possession 
of the minerals below; when title to the surface passes by adverse 
possession, so does the mineral estate. Sachs v. Board of 
Trustees, 89 N.M. 712, 721, 557 P.2d 209 (1976); 3 Arn. Jur.2d 
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,., 
"Adverse Possession" § 216 (1962); Annot., "Acquisition 
of Title of Mines or Minerals By Adverse Possession," 35 
A.L.R.2d 124, 129 (1954). But until severance, minerals in 
and under land are a part thereof. Broadhurst v. American 
Colloid Co., supra, 177 N.W.2d at 265. Thus, the presumptk 
this point must be that the defendant as adverse possessor o' 
the surface likewise has title to the minerals. This presur.; 
tion is rebuttable -- but it is up to the plaintiffs to rebut 
This they have never explicitly done. 
The Cooks went into possession of the land in question i:. 
1952. Any severance would have had to have occurred prior to 
their taking possession. See, e.g., Gesell v. Martin, 463 P. 
697, 700 {Okla. App. 1969). Hence, the 1959 quitclaim deed, 
even if it was not the product of duress {see Point I above), 
could not operate to di vest the Cooks of the mineral estate, 
since their possession of only seven years fell far short of 
the 25-year limitations period and so they had no interest i: 
either the surface or subsurface estates which they could co: 
. . h . 19 5 9 no sevc If they could not convey the mineral rig ts in ' 
d · d the suPf' 
. occurred at that time. So when, prior to 1952, i 
ed thi5 
severance take place? The plaintiffs have not answer 
question. Neither did the trial court. Possibly they thout 
k Purported · the severance occurred in 1950 when Aden Thornoc 
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convey the larger part of the land to La_wrence Johnson. 
But whether this is the case is a question of fact. on its 
face the deed recorded by the parties contained a reservation 
of mineral rights to the "grantee.~ The grantee being Johnson, 
to whom the surface estate was likewise granted by the same 
instrument, no severance took place since the full fee estate 
purportedly passed to Johnson then. 
However, even if "grantee" is held to mean "grantor" here 
a matter better left to a jury to decide -- no severance took 
place which is effective as against the Cooks, for several 
reasons. In the first place, only an effective deed will operate 
to sever the mineral estate from the surface estate. Thomas v. 
Southwestern Settlement & Development Co., 132 Tex. 413, 123 
S.W.2d 290, 300 (1939). But Thornock's deed to Johnson was 
ineffective to convey the surface to Johnson or reserve the 
minerals to Thornock because neither estate was ever Thornock's 
to convey, in other words, Thornock's title was defective. 
Without reiterating the full rationale for this position, which 
is set forth in the defendant's brief on appeal (at pages 3-4 
and 12-13) and in her reply brief (pages 3-12), it suffices to 
note by way of summary that there is an as-yet-unexplained break 
in Thornock's chain of title, namely, there is no record of a 
conveyance from Joseph E. Hatch & Co. to Joseph E. Hatch, who in 
turn conveyed the land to Thornock's grantors, the four Hatch 
daughters. Absent any evidence--and none has been adduced--that 
Joseph Hatch conveyed the land as agent of the corporation, and 
absent any evidence or even any allegation that the corporation 
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was merely the alter ego of Hatch whose independent existencE 
should be disregarded, it necessarily follows that the land, 
and a fortiori its minerals, were not Thornock' s to convey 
in 1952 or any other time. Nor does the record disclose any 
conveyance by Ezra T. Hatch of his one-half interest in the 
80-acre tract (N'2SE3i; of Sec. 24) which he and Joseph E. HaM. 
had acquired from the State of Utah. There is no showing th<: 
authority had been granted to Joseph E. Hatch to convey the i: 
terest in this tract owned by Ezra T. Hatch. There had been 
no severance of the minerals from the surface estate in this: 
acres prior to the time the period of adverse possession by 
Mrs. Cook had begwi to rwi. (The principle that a party hasr 
standing to challenge another's title on grounds which would 
invalidate her own record title--invoked by this Court in its 
prior opinion--is correct but is inapplicable here. In disw. 
ing Thornock' s record tit le Mrs. Cook is not breaking a link 
in her own chain of title (namely, the conveyance from Thorno: 
to her ostensible gr an tor Johnson) because she is not claimin: 
pursuant to that chain of title: Instead she claims title bi 
adverse possession vis-a-vis the owner of record, apparently 
still Joseph E. Hatch & Co.) 
Kanawha & Hocking Coal & Coke Co. v. Carbon County,~ 
relied upon by the plaintiffs and also cited in the earlier 
· f h · i'nconsi'stent wi'th this reasonin: opinion o t is Court, is not 
In that case the successor of the surface owner (not, as heti 
. t le tO : 
a claimant of the subsurface estate) sued to quiet ti 
t to i 
subsurface rights asserted by defendant county pursuan 
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tax sale. 535 P.2d at 1139. For purposes of passing on 
a motion for summary judgment, the trial court assumed the 
invalidity of the conveyance resulting from the tax sale. 
535 P.2d at 1140. This Court held that the tax sale was 
effective to sever the surface from the subsurface estates. 
535 P.2d at 1140. This instant case does not involve a tax 
sale and the plaintiffs here have not identified the transac-
tion which they contend proves severance as a matter of law. 
Kanawha & Hocking was not an ordinary adverse possession case; 
it was decided, not under the usual limitations statute, but 
under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5.2 (repl. vol. 
1953). 535 P.2d at 1139-40. Under that statute, "tax title" 
refers to any title to real property, "whether valid or not," 
derived through or dependent upon a tax sale of the property. 
U.C.A. § 78-12-5.3; Kanawha & Hocking Coal & Coke Co. v. Carbon 
~aunty, supra, 535 P.2d at 1140. In Kanawha there was no doubt 
as to which transaction effected a severance, and under the 
applicable statute the validity vel non of the conveyance was 
irrelevant to the effectiveness of the resulting severance. 
Absent such a special statute, however, as previously noted, only 
an effective deed results in severance of surface and mineral 
estates. Kanawha did not address that situation and is not 
contrary to the general rule. 
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That severance is pre-eminently an issue of fact, 
unsuitable to summary disposition is apparent from Toth v 
--------:_ 
Bigelow, 1 N.J. 399, 64 A.2d (1949), which involved an appEo 
from the trial court's de.nial of a motion to dismiss an act:-
to quiet title. The defendant-appellant, who conceded the 
plaintiff's title to the surface, contended that his claim:: 
the mineral rights was nonetheless based upon a misinterpre:; 
of certain deeds in the plaintiff's chain of title, and tha: 
actually there was a break in the chain of title. He furU.s: 
argued that, since there had been a prior severance of the 
surface and mineral estates, the plaintiff's possession oft· 
surface did not import possession of the minerals. 1N.J.1: 
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the issues of inteW' 
tation of the deeds and of severance pertained to the merits 
the case and should be resolved at trial, not before: 
We are met at the outset by the preliminary questio: 
of whether it is necessary at this time to enter 
into an examination and interpretation of the insw· 
ments in the respective chains of title of all the 
parties concerned. Appellant urges us that it is 
necessary to do so, his premise being based upon t;; 
argument that, a severance having occurred, a pr°F:;. 
interpretation of the chains of title would sho11 t''" 
such severance has never been reunited. While this 
. d d it necessar could conceivably be true we o not eem . ~· 
to consider the matter for we are of the opinion. ';: 
. . . th t . e when tne ,. this is a matter for decision at e im 
1 
,. 
is heard on the merits. At that time the appel anc 
Present evidence and argu!'lent that it deems fit 
1a
0 
.... 
· d · the ar .,. 
opposition to respondent's case, inclu ing ·ti' 
f h h · s of ti --based upon an interpretation o t e c ain . t ~· 
We are of the opinion, however, that at this //tea 
the suit it is neither necessary nor proper -0 
court to consider this argument. 
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In its essential elements the question is 
whether possession of the surface carries with 
it possession of the minerals underneath it 
in the face of an allegation of severance by 
a prior common owner, neither party having 
attempted to reduce the minerals in question 
to possession. We are of the opinion that it 
does. 
While the precise question does not appear to have 
been decided in this jurisdiction its answer flows 
from well known and logical principles. At the 
common law the rule was that ownership of the surface 
imported ownership of an indefinite extent, upwards 
and downwards. [Citations omitted]*** 
This rebuttable presumption of the common law is 
the rule in other jurisdictions as well as our own. 
[Citation omitted.]*** 
The appellant will be afforded an opportunity to 
rebut the presumption at the final hearing and if 
it is proven that a severance does in fact exist 
then the respondent's surface possession would not 
extend to the minerals. 
The appellant concedes the principle of the scope 
of ownership but asserts that, by reason of the 
alleged severance, it no longer applies. To be 
sure, the ownership of subsurface rights, including 
minerals, may be severed from the surface and 
thereafter constitute a separate fee in another plane 
of the same land and after such severance has been 
effected a distinct and separate estate of inheri-
tance exists therein. [Citations omitted] 
And,although the question does not seem to have been 
passed upon in New Jersey the great weight of 
authority is to the effect that, when such severance 
has been made, a possession of the surface d?es ~ot 
constitute possession of the subsurface. [Citations 
omitted]. 
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~owever, in the instant case the question 
is not, as appellant would have it, whether 
such a severance is valid, but whether it 
exists at all and this cannot be determined 
until a hearing on the merits. 
1 N.J. at 403-05. (Emphasis added). 
The rule of the Toth case is controlling here. The ck 
of severance, here as in Toth, presurnably reflects one party' 
interpretation of the deeds in the chain of title. If ther• 
is such a severance, possession of the surface conceded~~ 
not constitute possession of the minerals. But severance is 
a question of fact for the factfinder which is inappropriate 
swnmary disposition. 
Finally, even if the foregoing arguments were not decisi· 
the law relating to severance is inapplicable on these facts 
anyway. A severance is effective only between the parties t: 
the severance and those in privity with them. Clements v:_]_, 
Co., 273 s.w. 993, 1005 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1925). The Coor: 
were not parties to the Thornock/Johnson transaction and, t;,i 
their color of title, for purposes of adverse possession, ce: 
from Johnson, actually they could never have been in privit' 
with Johnson vis-a-vis this property because Johnson, like:. 
grantor Thornock, was without title to the land. 
Mrs. cook'' 
claim of title to the land with its subsurface rights depen:' 
not upon record title but rather upon her adverse possess-
of the property as against its true owner. Whether the e-· 
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of adverse possession can be shown to exist in these circum-
stances is, of course, a question of fact for the jury at 
trial. But it is at least clear that the plaintiffs have made 
no serious effort to show that no genuine issue of material fact 
exists as to the adverse possession issue, or that the plaintiffs 
are entitled to judgment as to that issue as a matter of law. 
Insofar as this Court in its previous opinion relied- upon the 
severance allegation, it had no occasion to pass upon the 
question whether the elements of adverse possession may be shown. 
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CONCLUSION 
It merits reiteration that the issues before the Court, 
in the present posture of the case, are very narrow. 
Essentially, the question is whether the plaintiffs as mov::.: 
party have articulated grounds and identified record evidenc-
establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
to either the duress or the adverse possession issues a~, 
further, that the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. For present purposes, the defendant asserts 
that such issues do, indeed, exist. The issue is not whethi: 
the Court finds the defendant's case to be particularly pm. 
sive; the only issue is whether the defendant is to be allw 
to present and develop her case at all to a jury of her pei:: 
Under the established standard of review of summary judgme:: 
the Court should reverse and remand, with the understandin·;· 
such a disposition is by no means an endorsement of the mer: 
of the defendant's case or a prediction as to the likely ou:: 
at trial. These other considerations are simply beside t~ 
point at this stage in the proceedings. It is enough to F 
reversal of the trial court that either there are triable li' 
of material fact as to the duress and adverse possession;;,. 
or else that, whether or not there truly are such issues,::: 
burden of sho1·:ii: plaintiffs have not discharged their heavy 
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the non-existence of such issues. 
For these reasons, appellant, prays the honorable Court 
to set aside the surrunary judgment below, together with the 
decree of quiet title, and to remand the entire matter for 
a trial on the merits in the District Court. 
Respectively submitted, 
Attorney for Appellant 
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